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Does Social Security Privatization Produce Efficiency Gains? 
 
 




While privatizing Social Security can improve labor supply incentives, it can also reduce 
risk sharing when households face uninsurable risks. We simulate a stylized 50-percent 
privatization using an overlapping-generations model where heterogeneous agents with 
elastic labor supply face idiosyncratic earnings shocks and longevity uncertainty. When 
wage shocks are insurable, privatization produces about $21,900 of new resources for 
each future household (growth adjusted over time) after all households have been fully 
compensated for their possible transitional losses. However, when wages are not 
insurable, privatization reduces efficiency by about $5,600 per future household despite 
improved labor supply incentives. 
 
We check the robustness of these results to different model specifications and arrive at 
several surprising conclusions. First, privatization actually performs relatively better in a 
closed economy, where interest rates decline with capital accumulation, than in an open 
economy where capital can be accumulated without reducing interest rates. Second, 
privatization also performs relatively better when an actuarially-fair private annuity 
market does not exist than when it does exist. Third, introducing progressivity into the 
privatized system to restore risk sharing must be done carefully. In particular, having the 
government match private contributions on a progressive basis is not very effective at 
restoring risk-sharing—too much matching actually harms efficiency. However, 
increasing the progressivity of the remaining traditional system is very effective at 
restoring risk sharing, thereby allowing partial privatization to produce efficiency gains 








Helpful comments were received from participants at the NBER Summer Institute Social 




It has been known for some time that shutting down (privatizing) a pay-as-you-go
social security system would simply reallocate resources between generations when all eco-
nomic variables are deterministic and labor supply is inelastic. In particular, no new re-
sources would be created in present value once the winners have fully compensated the
losers.1 Allowing for elastic labor supply as well as various risks that are difcult to insure
in the private market, however, changes things considerably.
On one hand, privatization could produce efciency gains by reducing the effective tax
rate on labor supply. Social Security's payroll taxes distort labor supply decisions because
the program redistributes resources both across and within generations. Across generations,
retiree benets are nanced on a pay-as-you-go basis with taxes on younger workers. When
the economy grows slower than the interest rate (i.e., is dynamically efcient), a worker
with average earnings receives less that one dollar in present value in future benets for
each dollar they contribute  the difference is an effective tax. This tax services the implicit
debt inherited from past generations who received more from Social Security than they paid.
Within generations, the U.S. Social Security system is progressive by giving a household with
a lower average index of monthly wages (AIME) a larger Social Security benet relative to
their AIME (i.e., a larger replacement rate). Contributions by households with higher-than
average lifetime earnings, therefore, are effectively used to subsidize the contributions by
households with lower-than average lifetime earnings. This redistribution increases effec-
tive marginal tax rates on households with AIME's above the economy-wide average while
reducing effective marginal tax rates on households with smaller AIME's.
On the other hand, the U.S. Social Security system also provides two sources of risk
sharing that could be reduced by privatization. First, the progressive benet formula shares
wage shocks among participants that are difcult to insure in the private market. Privatiza-
tion, therefore, could reduce this insurance unless it were complemented with some form of
redistribution. Second, Social Security pays benets until the beneciary and spouse dies
rather than over a xed number of years. To the extent that longevity uncertainty is also
1See, e.g., Breyer (1989), Feldstein (1995), Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1998), Murphy and Welch
(1998), Mariger (1999), Shiller (1999), and Diamond and Orszag (2003).
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difcult to insure privately, privatization could also reduce this annuity protection.
1.1 Overview of Our Approach
Determining the overall change in efciency from privatization requires simulation analy-
sis. We use a heterogeneous overlapping-generations model in which agents with elastic
labor supply face idiosyncratic earnings shocks and longevity uncertainty. The economy's
entire transition path after privatization is calculated, allowing us to determine the efciency
gain or loss from this reform.2 All households across generations and income classes receive
rebates or are taxed by exactly enough to return their expected remaining lifetime utility to
their pre-reform levels. If the net amount of new resources remaining after these rebates
and taxes is positive, then privatization produces an efciency gain; if negative, an efciency
loss. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), new net resources (positive or negative) are
distributed to future households in equal amounts (growth adjusted over time).
In our particular policy experiment, we consider a stylized partial privatization where
households immediately begin to redirect 50 percent of their payroll tax into private accounts.
Traditional Social Security benets, though, are reduced slowly across cohorts and eventually
reach 50 percent of their original scheduled value for the youngest workers alive at the time
of reform. Cash ow decits, therefore, emerge during the transition which are nanced
with a consumption tax; Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) used a deterministic model
to show that consumption tax nancing of the transition creates fewer distortions to labor
supply and capital accumulation than income or wage tax nancing.3
1.2 Summary of Our Findings
We nd that privatization can substantially improve labor supply incentives: When wage
shocks are assumed to be insurable in the private market, our stylized partial privatization
2The insurance value of pay-as-you-go Social Security has also been investigated by Imrohoroglu, Imro-
horoglu, and Joines (1995) and Conesa and Krueger (1999). Imrohoroglu et al. focus on steady states and nd
that the value of risk sharing is outweighed by the reduction in capital. Conesa and Krueger consider whether
a majority of the population would support privatization. Our analysis nds that while privatization typically
raises long-run welfare it often fails to increase efciency due to larger losses to transitional generations.
3Nishiyama and Smetters (2004) show that a consumption tax, though, might be less efcient than a progres-
sive income tax in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. Still, using a proportional increase in the income tax, as
examined in KSW, would not overturn our key results.
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produces new net resources equal to $21,900 per future household in our benchmark model.
However, when, more realistically, wages are not insurable, privatization reduces efciency
by about $5,600 per future household despite improving labor supply incentives. This loss
occurs even though privatization substantially increases the welfare of those born in the long
run by increasing the capital stock.
The efciency loss that we calculate when wages are not insurable, though, makes three
key assumptions that might appear at rst to be biased against privatization. Several surpris-
ing insights emerge, however, as we investigate each of these assumptions more closely.
First, our benchmark economy is closed to international capital ows. As a result, capital
accumulation after privatization reduces interest rates, discouraging more accumulation. If,
instead, capital could ow across borders then more capital could be accumulated with no
reduction in the rate of return to saving.
However, interestingly, we nd that the efciency losses from partial privatization are
even larger (equal to about $6,600 per future household) in a small open economy version of
our model that allows for perfect international capital ows. To be sure, privatization leads to
substantially more capital accumulation in this case. But, for the purpose of determining ef-
ciency gains, the higher interest rate in the open economy case, relative to privatization in the
closed economy, also means that it is more costly to borrow against the long-run gains from
privatization in order to compensate households alive during the transition that would other-
wise lose from privatization. This nding emphasizes the fact that gains to macroeconomic
variables alone are not necessarily good metrics for inferring efciency gains.
Second, our benchmark calculations assume that a private annuity market does not ex-
ist, and so the pre-reform Social Security system not only provides insurance against wage
uncertainty but against longevity as well. Households, therefore, must guard against outliv-
ing their resources after privatization by relying more on precautionary saving, which is less
efcient at smoothing consumption across states than insurance markets when shocks are
idiosyncratic.
However, rather surprisingly, we nd that allowing for an actuarially-fair private annuity
market also increases efciency losses (about $7,200 per future household) relative to our
benchmark privatization simulation. This result can be mostly traced to the relative smaller
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amount of precautionary saving after privatization when private annuity markets exist. The
larger interest rate in this case increases the cost at which compensation can be made across
generations. Less precautionary savings and lower labor supply also reduce the tax bases rel-
ative to the benchmark privatization, thereby increasing the income tax rates that are required
to fund the rest of government.
Third, our benchmark partial privatization does not explicitly include any mechanism
that shares idiosyncratic wage shocks that were previously partially insured under Social
Security. Since private markets generally do not exist for insuring wages, households must
again rely on more precautionary saving, which is less efcient than insurance.
We, therefore, also simulate privatization where the government matches contributions
made by poorer households; the match is nanced by increasing general-revenue income
taxes proportionally. This match is permanent across time but phased out linearly across
income classes so that a household with median income receives no match. A match equal
to 10 percent of income at a low level of income is indeed effective at reducing the efciency
loss to about $4,400 per future household, but a 20-percent match actually increases the loss
to $9,900. This non-monotonic behavior is due to the trade-off between risk sharing and
labor supply distortions: some match is benecial but is dominated by distortions at higher
tax rates. In fact, there is no match rate that allows privatization to produced efciency
gains; alternative designs of contribution matching (e.g., without a phase-out) performed
even worse.
Finally and related, we show that simply increasing the progressivity of the smaller Social
Security program that remains after partial privatization performs quite well at restoring risk
sharing and can even lead to overall efciency gains after privatization (about $2,700 per
future household). Compared to contribution matching, this alternative produces smaller
marginal tax rates because Social Security benets are computed based on lifetime earnings
whereas the match is based on contemporaneous earnings.
1.3 Outline of Rest of the Paper
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the model; Section 3 explains the
calibration of the model; Section 4 presents results from various privatization simulations;
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and Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendices explain the computational algorithm in
more detail and contain various calibration information.
2 Model
Our model has three sectors: heterogeneous households with elastic labor supply; a com-
petitive representative rm with constant-returns-to-scale production technology; and a gov-
ernment with a full commitment technology. Like most previous analyses of Social Security
reform, our model's pre-reform neoclassical economy is stationary by construction, and so
we don't capture the effects of projected demographic changes.4 We, however, are only
interested in comparing the efciency of gains from privatization against the baseline, not
examining the implications of demographics. We used a similar model in Nishiyama and
Smetters (2004) to analyze potential reforms of the federal income tax; the model in the cur-
rent paper adds a Social Security system which requires an additional state variable in order
to track a household's historical average earnings.
2.1 The Household Sector
Households are heterogeneous with respect to the following variables: age, i; working
ability, ei (measured by hourly wages); beginning-of-period wealth holdings, ai; and, aver-
age historical earnings, bi, that determine their Social Security benets. Each year, a large
number (normalized to unity) of new households of age 20 enter the economy. Population
grows at a constant rate, . A household of age i observes an idiosyncratic working ability
shock, ei, at the beginning of each year and chooses its optimal consumption ci, working
hours hi, and end-of-period wealth holding ai+1, taking as given the government's policy
schedule and future factor prices.5 At the end of each year, a fraction of households die
according to standard mortality rates; no one lives beyond age 109. For simplicity, all house-
holds represent two-earner married couples of the same age.
4We are aware of only a few papers, including De Nardi, Imrohoroglu and Sargent (1999), Kotlikoff, Smetters
and Walliser (2001), and Nishiyama (2004), that attempt to capture the effect of non-stationary demographics on
baseline factor prices.
5Because there are no aggregate shocks in the present model, households can perfectly foresee these factor
prices and policy variables, using the current distribution of households and the current policy variables. Yet,
their own future working ability and mortality are uncertain.
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2.1.1 The Household's Problem
Let si denote the state of an age i household,
si = (i; ei; ai; bi) ;
where i 2 I = f20; :::; 109g is the household's age, ei 2 E = [emin; emax] is its working
ability (the hourly wage), ai 2 A = [amin; amax] is its beginning-of-period wealth, and
bi 2 B = [bmin; bmax] is its average historical earnings for Social Security purposes.6
Let St denote the state of the economy at the beginning of year t,
St = (xt (si) ;WLS;t;WG;t) ;
where xt (si) is the joint distribution of households where si 2 I  E  A  B. WLS;t is
the beginning-of-period net wealth held by the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA),
which as described below, is used to determine the efciency gain or loss from privatization.
WG;t is the net wealth of the rest of the government.
Let	t denote the government policy schedule known at the beginning of year t,
	t = fWLS;s+1;WG;s+1; CG;s; I;s (:) ; P;s (:) ; C;s; trSS;s (si) ; trLS;s (si)g1s=t ;
whereCG;s is government consumption, I;s (:) is an income tax function, P;s (:) is a payroll
tax function for Social Security (OASDI), C;s is a consumption tax rate, trSS;s (si) is a
Social Security benet function, and trLS;s (si) is an LSRA wealth redistribution function.
The specications of these functions are described below.
The household's problem is
v (si;St;	t) = max
ci;hi
ui (ci; hi) +  (1 + )
(1 ) iE [v (si+1;St+1;	t+1) jei] (1)
6The average historical earnings are used to calculate the Social Security benets of each household. The






fwteihi + (1 + rt) (ai + trLS;t (si)) (2)
  I;t (wteihi; rt (ai + trLS;t (si)) ; trSS;t (si))
 P;t (wteihi) + trSS;t (si)  (1 + C;t) cig  amini+1;t (si) ;
a20 = 0; ai2f65;:::;110g  0;





  ci)(hmaxi   hi)1 
o1 
1   ; (3)
 is the coefcient of relative risk aversion; ni is the number of dependent children at the
parents' age i;  is the adult equivalency scale that converts the consumption by children
into their adult equivalent amounts; and, hmaxi is the maximum working hours.
The constant  is the rate of time preference; i is the survival rate at the end of age i; wt
is the wage rate per efciency unit of labor (accordingly, wteihi is total labor compensation
at age i in time t); and, rt is the rate of return to capital. Individual variables of the model are
normalized by the exogenous rate of labor augmenting technological change, . Our choice
for ui(:) is consistent with the conditions that are necessary for the existence of a long-run
steady state in the presence of constant population growth. Hence,  is also equal to the per-
capita growth rate of output and capital in steady state. The term (1 + )(1 ), therefore,
is the growth-adjusted rate of time preference.
amini+1;t(si) is the state-contingent minimum level of end-of-period wealth that is sustain-
able, that is, even if the household receives the worst possible shocks in future working abil-
ities.7 At the beginning of the next period, the state of this household when private annuity
7In particular, amini+1;t(si) is allowed to be negative but cannot exceed in magnitude the present value of the
worst possible future labor income stream at maximumworking hours. Although not shown explicitly in equation
(2) in order to save on notation, any borrowing (i.e., ai+1 < 0) by an agent age i at time t must be done at rate
rt=i in order cover the chance that they will die before repaying their loan.
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markets do not exist becomes
si+1 = (i+ 1; ei+1; ai+1 + qt; bi+1) ; (4)
where qt denotes accidental bequests that a household receives at the end of the period. In
the presence of perfect annuity markets, the household's state in the next period is instead
si+1 = (i+ 1; ei+1; ai+1=i; bi+1) : (5)
The average historical earnings for this household, bi, follows the following process,
bi+1 =
8>>><>>>:





+min (wteihi=2; wehmaxt )g if 25  i  59
bi=(1 + ) if i  60
; (6)
where wehmaxt is the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax cap, which
is $80,400 in 2001. For simplicity, the model assumes that the highest 35 years of earnings
correspond to between ages 25 and 59.8
2.1.2 The Measure of Households
Let xt (si) denote the measure of households, and letXt (si) be the corresponding cumu-
lative measure. The measure of households is adjusted by the steady-state population growth
rate, . The population of age 20 households is normalized to unity in the baseline economy
along the balanced growth path, that is,Z
E
dXt (20; e20; 0; 0) = 1:
Let 1[a=y] be an indicator function that returns 1 if a = y and 0 if a 6= y: Then, the law of







 1[bi+1=bi+1(wteihi(si;St;	);bi)]i;i+1(ei+1jei)dXt (si) ;
8U.S. Social Security benets are computed on the basis of the highest 35 years of earnings, up to age 60. We
assume that these years occur between ages 25 and 59 to avoid 34 additional state variables.
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where i;i+1 denotes the transition probability of working ability from age i to age i+ 1.
2.1.3 Distribution of Bequests
The aggregate value of accidental bequests each period is deterministic in our model
because all risks are idiosyncratic and, therefore, uncorrelated across households. Acciden-
tal bequests could, therefore, be simply distributed equally and deterministically across all
surviving households, as in some other papers. That approach, however, suffers from two
shortcomings. First, households would anticipate receiving a bequest with certainty, thereby
articially crowding out their pre-bequest savings. This savings reduction would be miti-
gated if bequests were random. Second, empirically, the inequality of bequests is important
in generating a realistic measure of wealth inequality.
Our alternative strategy, therefore, distributes bequests randomly to surviving working-



















where qt is the average wealth left by deceased households and  is the ratio of deceased
household to the surviving working-age households.
2.2 Government
Government tax revenue consists of federal income tax TI;t, payroll tax for Social Secu-




















C;tci(si;St;	t)dXt (si) : (11)






trSS;t (si) dXt (si) : (12)




(1 + ) (1 + )
 f(1 + rt)WG;t + TI;t + TP;t + TC;t   TrSS;t   CG;tg ; (13)
where CG;t is government consumption.
2.3 Measuring Efciency Gains
We follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) by measuring efciency gains from Social
Security privatization using a Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority that compensates house-
holds who would otherwise lose from reform.9 To be clear, the LSRA is not being pro-
posed as an actual government institution that attempts to produce Pareto-improving policy
changes. Instead, it is simply a hypothetical mechanism that allows us to measure the stan-
dard Hicksian efciency gains in general equilibrium associated with privatization.
To see how the LSRA works, suppose that a new policy is announced at the beginning
of period 1. First, the LSRA makes a lump-sum compensating variation transfer or tax,
trCV;1 (si), to each living household of age i to return its expected remaining lifetime utility
at state si to its pre-reform level in the baseline (pre-reform) economy. Next, the LSRA
makes a lump-sum transfer or tax, trCV;t (s20), to each future household (born in periods 2,
3, ...) to make it as well off as in the baseline economy, conditional on its initial state at age
20. Thus far, however, the net present value of these taxes and transfers across living and
future households will generally not sum to zero. So, nally, the LSRA makes an additional
lump-sum transfer (tax), tr, to each future household so that the net present value across
9We, however, extend the Auerbach and Kotlikoff approach to a heterogeneous-agent environment.
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all transfers is zero. For illustrative purposes, we assume, like Auerbach and Kotlikoff, that
these additional transfers are uniform across future generations on a growth-adjusted basis.
The lump-sum transfers made by the LSRA, therefore, are
trLS;t(si) =
8>>><>>>:
trCV;t (si) if t = 1
trCV;t (si) + tr if t > 1 and i = 20
0 otherwise
: (14)
If tr > 0 then privatization has produced net new resources and so we say that this
reform increases efciency. Conversely, iftr < 0 then privatization reduces efciency.






trLS;t (si) dXt (si) : (15)




(1 + ) (1 + )
(1 + rt) (WLS;t   TrLS;t) : (16)
2.4 Aggregation and Production
National wealthWt is the sum of total private wealth, government net wealthWG;t, and












eihi(si;St;	t)dXt (si) : (18)
In a closed economy, capital stock is equal to national wealth, that is, Kt = Wt; and
gross national product Yt is determined by a constant-returns-to-scale production function,
Yt = F (Kt; Lt):
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The prot-maximizing condition for this competitive rm is
FK(Kt; Lt) = rt + ; (19)
FL(Kt; Lt) = wt; (20)
where  is the depreciation rate of capital.
In a small open economy, factor prices, rt and wt are xed at international levels, and
domestic capital stock KD;t and labor supply Lt are determined so that the rm's prot
maximizing condition satises,
FK(KD;t; Lt) = r

t + ;
FL(KD;t; Lt) = w

t :
Gross domestic product YD;t is determined by the production function,
YD;t = F (KD;t; Lt);
and gross national product Yt is determined by
Yt = (r

t + )Wt + w

t Lt:
Net foreign investment is shown by the difference between national wealth and domestic
capital stock, that is,Wt  KD;t.
2.5 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Denition Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: Let si = (i; ei; ai; bi) be the individual
state of households, let St = (xt(si);WLS;t;WG;t) be the state of the economy, and let 	t
be the government policy schedule known at the beginning of year t,
	t = fWLS;s+1;WG;s+1; CG;s; I;s (:) ; P;s (:) ; C;s; trSS;s (si) ; trLS;s (si)g1s=t :
A series of factor prices frs; wsg1s=t, accidental bequests fqsg1s=t, the policy variables
fWLS;s+1;WG;s+1; CG;s; C;s; trLS;s (si)g1s=t, the parameters of policy functions f'sg1s=t,
12
Table 1: Common Parameters
Coefcient of relative risk aversion  2.0
Capital share of output  0.30
Depreciation rate of capital stock  0.047
Long-term real growth rate  0.018
Population growth rate  0.010
Probability of receiving bequests  0.0161
Total factor productivity 1 A 0.949
1. Total factor productivity is chosen so thatw equals 1.0.
the value function of households fv (si;Ss;	s)g1s=t; the decision rule of households
fd(si;Ss;	s)g1s=t = fci(si;Ss;	s); hi(si;Ss;	s); ai+1(si;Ss;	s)g1s=t;
and the measure of households fxs(si)g1s=t, are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, in
every period s = t; :::;1, each household solves the utility maximization problem (1)(6)
taking 	t as given; the rm solves its prot maximization problem, the capital and labor
market conditions (17)(20) clear, and the government policy schedule satises (8)(16).
In steady-state,
St+1 = St
for all t and si 2 I  E AB:
3 Calibration
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the model's key parameters, as discussed below.
3.1 Households
Utility Function Parameters. The coefcient of relative risk aversion, , is assumed to
be 2.0. The number of dependent children at the parents' age i, ni, is calculated using the
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) as shown in Table 3. The adult equivalency
scale, , is set at 0.6.10 As discussed later,  is chosen to hit a target capital-output ratio,
10Hence, a married couple with two dependent children must consume about 52 percent (i.e., 20:6 = 1:517)
more than a married couple with no children to attain the same level of utility, ceteris paribus.
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Table 2: Other Main Parameters
Representative- Heterogeneous-Agent Economy
Agent Model with Wage Shocks
without Wage Lower Transi-
Shocks tory Shocks to
1/2 1/5
Time preference parameter 1  1.004 0.985 0.992 1.000
Share parameter for consumption 2  0.436 0.466 0.456 0.450
Income tax adjustment factor 3 'I 1.000 0.818 0.847 0.874
OASDI benet adjustment factor 4 'SS 1.232 1.385 1.388 1.388
1. The capital-GDP ratio is targeted to be 2.74 (r = 6.25 percent) without annuity markets.
2. The average annual working hours are 3414 per married couple when hmax= 8760.
3. In a heterogeneous-agent economy, the ratio of income tax revenue to GDP is 0.123.
4. The OASDI budget is assumed to be balanced.
Table 3: Number of People Under Age 18 Living in a Married Household
Age cohorts Number of children Age cohorts Number of children
20-24 0.642 50-54 0.908
25-29 1.167 55-59 0.562
30-34 1.451 60-64 0.231
35-39 1.755 65-69 0.156
40-44 1.753 70-74 0.055
45-49 1.439 75-plus 0.000
Source: Authors' calculations from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
producing an interest rate of 6.2 percent in the initial steady state. The maximum working
hours of husband and wife, hmaxi , is set at 8,760, equal to 12 hours per day per person 
365 days two persons.11 A smaller value for hmaxi would reduce the effective labor supply
elasticity, and tend to reduce the gains from privatization. The parameter  is chosen so that
the average working hours of households between ages 20 and 64 equals 3,414 hours in the
initial steady-state economy, the average number of hours supplied by married households in
the 2001 SCF.
11The 95th and 99th percentiles of the working hours per married couple of aged 20-64 in the 2001 SCF are
5,280 and 6,375, respectively.
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Table 4: Working Abilities of a Household (in U.S. Dollars per Hour)
Percentile Age Cohorts
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
e1 0-20th 3.89 5.47 6.86 6.01 7.43 5.73
e2 20-40th 8.35 10.11 12.38 12.27 13.90 13.14
e3 40-60th 10.28 14.04 16.46 16.96 18.76 18.47
e4 60-80th 12.31 17.30 21.87 22.57 25.79 25.71
e5 80-90th 17.47 21.58 29.37 30.19 35.37 35.56
e6 90-95th 22.17 27.21 33.96 46.92 48.30 54.59
e7 95-99th 29.43 36.60 43.76 81.75 96.44 97.48
e8 99-100th 42.31 62.29 182.78 327.65 262.03 284.00
Percentile Age cohorts
50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79
e1 0-20th 5.00 2.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
e2 20-40th 13.99 10.65 3.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
e3 40-60th 20.95 15.60 11.00 1.92 0.00 0.00
e4 60-80th 29.13 24.60 18.33 11.14 1.77 1.30
e5 80-90th 40.89 34.75 29.08 19.14 10.93 10.21
e6 90-95th 54.11 51.62 44.41 29.99 20.66 20.88
e7 95-99th 91.67 99.24 91.12 56.19 38.26 26.41
e8 99-100th 282.18 333.58 555.90 244.71 193.00 86.76
Source: Authors' calculations from the 2001 SCF.
Working Ability. The working ability in this calibration corresponds to the hourly wage
(labor income per hour) of each household in the 2001 SCF.12 The average hourly wage of a
married couple (family members #1 and #2 in SCF) used in the calibration is calculated by
Hourly Wage =
Regular and Additional Salaries (#1+ #2) + Payroll Taxes / 2
max {Working Hours (#1+ #2), 2080}
:
We adjusted the salaries in the numerator by adding imputed payroll taxes paid by their
employers, which allows us to levy the entire payroll tax on employees in order to incorporate
the payroll tax ceiling. The max operator in the denominator adjusts the hourly wage for a
small fraction of households in the SCF with large reported salaries but few reported working
hours such as the self-employed.
12According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, the average hourly earnings of production workers have in-
creased by 3.8 percent from 2000 to 2001. Since the 2001 SCF wages correspond to year 2000 while our tax
function introduced below is calibrated to the year 2001, we multiply the SCF wages shown in Table 4 by 1.038
to convert the hourly wages in 2000 into growth-adjusted wages in 2001.
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Table 4 shows the eight discrete levels of working abilities of ve-year age cohorts. We
use a shape-preserving cubic spline interpolation between each ve-year age cohort to obtain
the working ability for each age cohort.13 In the version of our model where we turn off
the idiosyncratic wage shocks, the hourly wages of the representative household are assumed
to be those of the 4060th percentile households.
Table 4, however, only shows the different potential wage buckets by age as well as
the proportion of households in each bucket. It does not itself capture the uncertainty over
wages. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), therefore, we estimate Markov
transition matrixes that specify the probabilities that a household's wage will move from one
level to a different level the next year. Separate transition matrixes were constructed for four
age ranges20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59in order to capture the possibility that the
probabilities themselves might change over the lifecycle. For households aged 60 or older,
we used the matrix for ages 50-59. The Appendix reports the matrixes in detail. We check
the sensitivity of our simulation results to this specication later in the paper.
Population Growth and Mortality. The population growth rate  is set to one percent per
year, consistent with Social Security Administration (2001) long-run estimates. The survival
rate i at the end of age i = f20; :::; 109g are the weighted averages of the male and female
survival rates as calculated by SSA. The survival rates at the end of age 109 are replaced by
zero, thereby capping the maximum length of life. See the Appendix for more details.
3.2 Production
Capital and Private Wealth. CapitalK is the sum of private xed assets and government
xed assets. In 2000, private xed assets were $21,165 billion, government xed assets were
$5,743 billion, and the public held about $3,410 billion of government debt.14 Government
net wealth, therefore, is set equal to 9.5 percent of total private wealth in the initial steady-
state economy. Moreover, the time preference parameter  is chosen in each variant of our
model explored below so that the capital-GDP ratio in the initial steady state economy is
13An alternative approach of estimating eight different wage rates for each age would have relied on too few
observations.
14Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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2.74, the empirical value in 2000.15
Production Technology. Production takes the Cobb-Douglas form,





where, recall, Lt is the sum of working hours in efciency units. The capital share of output
is given by
 = 1  Compensation of Employees + (1  ) Proprietors' Income
National Income + Consumption of Fixed Capital
:
The value of  in 2000 was 0.30.16 The annual per-capita growth rate  is assumed to be 1.8
percent, the average rate between 1869 to 1996 (Barro, 1997). Total factor productivity A is
set at 0.949, which normalizes the wage (per efcient labor unit) to unity.
The Depreciation Rate of Fixed Capital. The depreciation rate of xed capital  is chosen





In 2000, private gross xed investment accounted for 17.2 percent of GDP, and government
(federal and state) gross investment accounted for 3.3 percent of GDP.17 With a capital-
output ratio of 2.74, the ratio of gross investment to xed capital is 7.5 percent. Subtracting
productivity and population growth rates, the annual depreciation rate is 4.7 percent.
3.3 The Government
Income Taxes. Federal income tax and state and local taxes are assumed to be at the level
in year 2001 before the passage of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). Since households in our model are assumed to be married, we
use a standard deduction of $7,600. However, following Altig et al. (2001), we allow higher
income households to itemize deductions when it is more valuable to do so, and we assume
15Ibid.
16Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. The average of  in years between 1996
and 2000 is 0.31.
17ibid.
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Table 5: Marginal Individual Income Tax Rates in 2001 (Married Household, Filed Jointly)
Taxable Income Marginal Income Tax Rate (%)
$0  $45,200 15.0 'I
$45,200  $109,250 28.0 'I
$109,250  $166,500 31.0 'I
$166,500  $297,350 36.0 'I
$297,350  39.6 'I
that the value of the itemized deduction increases linearly in the Adjusted Gross Income.18
The additional exemption per dependent person is $2,900 where the number of dependent
children is consistent with Table 3. Table 5 shows the statutory marginal tax rates before
EGTRRA.19 As noted earlier, a household's labor income in this calibration includes the
imputed payroll tax paid by its employer. Thus, taxable income is obtained by subtracting
the employer portion of payroll tax from labor income.
The standard deduction, the personal exemption, and all tax brackets grow with produc-
tivity over time so that there is no real bracket creep; this indexing is also needed for the
initial economy to be in steady state. Also, since the effective tax rate on capital income
is reduced by investment tax incentives, accelerated depreciation and other factors (Auer-
bach, 1996), the tax function is further adjusted so that the cross-sectional average tax rate
on capital income is about 25 percent lower than the average tax on labor income.20 In 2000,
the ratio of total individual federal income tax revenue (not including Social Security and
Medicare taxes) to GDP was 0.102 and the ratio of corporate income tax to GDP was 0.021.
Each statutory federal income tax rate shown in Table 5, therefore, is multiplied by 'I so that
tax revenue (including corporate income tax) totals 12.3 percent of GDP in the initial steady
state. The adjustment factor is between 0.82 and 0.87 for heterogeneous-agent economies
with idiosyncratic wage shocks and 1.0 for the representative-agent economy without wage
shocks. State and local income taxes are modeled parsimoniously with a 4.0 percent at tax
18In particular, the deduction taken by a household is the greater of the standard deduction and 0:0755AGI,
ormaxf$7600; 0:0755AGIg.
19The key qualitative results reported herein are unaffected if the tax function were instead modeled as net
taxes, that is, after substracting transfers indicated in the Statistics of Income.
20This relative reduction to the tax rate on capital is commonly used by CBO, and it balances the legal tax
preferences given to capital versus the legal tax benets given to labor, including tax-preferred fringe benets.
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Table 6: Marginal Payroll Tax Rates in 2001
Taxable Labor Marginal Tax Rate (%)
Income per Worker OASDI HI
$0  $80,400 12.4 'P 2.9
$80,400  0.0 'P 2.9
Note: The payroll tax adjustment factor 'P equals 1.0 in.
the baseline economy.
Table 7: OASDI Replacement Rates in 2001
AIME (b/12) Marginal Replacement Rate (%)
$0  $561 90.0 'SS
$561  $3,381 32.0 'SS
$3,381  15.0 'SS
Note: The OASDI benet adjustment factor 'SS is set so
that the OASDI is pay-as-you-go in the baseline economies.
on income above the deduction and exemption levels used at the federal level.
Social Security. The tax rate levied on employees for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance (OASDI) is 12.4 percent, and the tax rate for Medicare (HI) is 2.9 percent. In
2001, employee compensation above $80,400 was not taxable for OASDI. (See Table 6.)
Social Security benets are based on each worker's Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME), bi=12, and the replacement rate schedule in the United States. The replacement
rates are 90 percent for the rst $561, 32 percent for amounts between $561 and $3,381,
and 15 percent for amounts above $3,381. Social Security, therefore, is progressive in that a
worker's benet relative to AIME (the replacement rate) is decreasing in the AIME.
The U.S. OASDI also pays spousal, survivors' and disability benets in addition to the
standard retirement benet described above. Indeed, retiree benets accounted for only 69.1
percent of total OASDI benets in December 2000.21 OASDI benets, therefore, are ad-
justed upward by the proportional adjustment factor 'SS so that total benet payments equal
total payroll tax revenue. The adjustment factor 'SS equals about 1.39 in our model with
wage shocks and 1.23 in our model without wage shocks. This adjustment proportionally
21See Table 5.A1 in Social Security Administration (2001).
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distributes non-retiree OASDI payments across retirees.
4 Policy Experiments
We simulate a stylized phased-in partial privatization of Social Security that begins in
year 1. Workers immediately start redirecting 50 percent of their payroll tax payments into
private saving accounts. As is implicit in most previous work on privatization, assets in the
new private accounts are assumed to be perfect substitutes with other private assets, including
earning the same market rate of return and being subject to the same income tax schedule, as
outlined above. As a result, the new private accounts do not have to be explicitly modeled;
the redirected payroll simply augment regular household saving.
Social Security benets are reduced linearly over time. Households age 66 and older
in year 1 receive the current-law (baseline) benets throughout the rest of their lifetime;
households of age 65 in year 1 receive benets that are 1.25 percent lower than the current-
law level throughout the rest of lifetime; households of age 64 in year 1 receive benets 2.5
percent lower than the current law-level, and so on. Households age 25 or younger in year 1,
therefore, receive one half of their traditional Social Security benets when they turn 65.
Since benet payments are reduced more slowly than payroll taxes during the transitional
period, Social Security faces a cash-ow decit that we nance with a consumption tax; work
by Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001) also focused on consumption tax nancing as a
method of producing the largest macroeconomic gains from privatization. Since changes
to the Social Security system will also inuence the size of the capital stock and, hence,
non-Social Security government receipts, the rest of the government budget is balanced by
proportional changes in marginal income tax rates.
We rst consider the representative-agent economy without wage shocks (equivalently,
with insurable wage shocks) where all households have the wage prole of the 4060th
percentile in Table 4, i.e., lifetime income group e3. We then turn to a heterogeneous-agent
economy with uninsurable wage shocks. We initially assume that both economies are closed
to international capital ows, and that a private annuity market does not exist.
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Table 8: Percent Change in Selected Macro Variables Relative to Baseline
GNP National Labor Interest Wage Income Consump-
Run # Year t Wealth Supply Rate Rate Tax tion Tax
Rate2 Rate
1 1 2.4 0.0 3.4 4.2 -1.0 -13.4 6.5
Representative 10 3.8 6.4 2.7 -4.3 1.1 -14.6 5.7
Agent without 20 5.4 10.9 3.1 -8.7 2.2 -16.6 4.3
Wage Shocks1 40 8.3 17.6 4.6 -13.8 3.6 -20.1 1.1
Long Run 9.3 20.7 4.8 -16.4 4.3 -21.2 -0.2
2 1 1.3 0.0 1.8 2.3 -0.5 -5.7 5.5
Heterogenous 10 2.5 4.3 1.7 -3.0 0.7 -6.6 4.8
Agents with 20 4.0 8.1 2.2 -6.7 1.7 -8.1 3.6
Wage Shocks1 40 6.7 15.1 3.4 -12.7 3.3 -10.6 0.9
Long Run 7.8 18.7 3.5 -16.0 4.2 -11.3 -0.2
*1. Closed economy, no private annuity markets, and LSRA is off.
*2. The proportional change in marginal tax rates across all households.
4.1 Representative-Agent Economy without Wage Shocks
As shown in Run 1 in Table 8, partial privatization of Social Security in the representative-
agent economy increases national wealth by 20.7 percent in the long run compared to the
baseline economy. GNP increases by 9.3 percent in the long run, while labor supply in-
creases by 4.8 percent. These large gains are driven by pre-funding a portion of Social
Security's liabilities that were previously nanced on a pay-as-you-go (unfunded) basis.
Moreover, national wealth and GNP increase throughout the entire transition path. Labor
supply initially increases by 3.4 percent in the rst year as households reoptimize their life-
cycle choices after the policy change. However, labor supply declines slightly between years
1 and 20 after the reform before eventually increasing. The reason for this non-monotonic
behavior is two-fold. First, as shown in Table 8, labor supply increases faster than capital
during part of the rst decade after reform, briey decreasing the wage rate by about 1 per-
cent. Second, the new temporary consumption tax, which starts at 6.5 percent and comes
down over time as Social Security benets are gradually reduced, discourages labor supply
during the transition.22
Despite these positive gains to economic variables, not everyone wins from privatization.
22The consumption tax does not return exactly to zero in the long run due to a larger labor supply interacting
with the progressive benet schedule within the smaller Social Security system that remains after privatization.
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Table 9: Change in Welfare per Household (1,000 dollars in 2001)
Without LSRA1 With LSRA2
Age in Select Productivities For all
Run # Year 1 e1 e3 e5 e8 Productivities
1 79 - -7.5 - - 0.0
Representative 60 - -47.4 - - 0.0
Agent without 40 - -60.0 - - 0.0
Wage Shocks 20 - -16.9 - - 0.0
0 - 24.6 - - 21.9
-20 - 47.1 - - 21.9
2 79 -4.8 -5.7 -14.7 -79.3 0.0
Heterogenous 60 -27.6 -43.5 -64.4 -361.8 0.0
Agents with 40 -18.7 -46.7 -76.4 -368.4 0.0
Wage Shocks 20 2.2 -1.5 -5.2 -15.5 0.0
0 32.8 33.7 36.1 43.4 -5.6
-20 52.4 56.7 63.5 84.3 -5.6
*1. Standard equivalent variations measures.
*2. Value oftr:
As shown for Run 1 in Table 9 (Without LSRA), all households alive at the time of the
reform (that is, aged 20 or older) are worse off. For example, the age-20 household at the
time of policy change loses $16,900, as measured by the equivalent variation of an one-
time wealth transfer made at the time of the reform. The age-40 household loses $60,000.
These losses are mainly caused by the transitional consumption tax, which especially harms
middle-aged households that hold a large amount of non-Social Security wealth.23 In a closed
economy, these households are also hurt by the fall in the interest rate shown in Table 8.24
Future households, who pay very little of the transition costs, however, gain substantially
from privatization. For example, newborns in Year 1 gain about $24,600 per couple while
generations born 20 years later gain about $47,100. These gains arise mainly from higher
wages and from the reduced distortions from payroll taxes. Federal income taxes also decline
by 21.2 percent in the long run due to an expanded economy.
However, does privatization actually produce overall efciency gains, that is, after the
winners compensate the losers? To make this determination, we simulate the same ex-
23Social Security wealth under law and in our model is protected by ination, including that caused by con-
sumption taxes.
24For example, the welfare loss of a 40-year old is reduced by half in a small open economy (not shown),
where the interest rate does not change.
22
periment but with an operative Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA).25 Recall that
the LSRA transfers exactly enough wealth to would-be losing households alive at the time of
the reform so that their remaining expected lifetime utilities return to their pre-reform levels.
These transfers must be nanced with borrowing that is nanced with the gains to future gen-
erations. All net new resources (positive or negative) are then distributed equally to future
households (growth adjusted over time). As shown in Table 9, privatization produces about
$21,900 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) in additional net resources per each future house-
hold that enters the economy in year 2 and later. In other words, the 50-percent phased-in
privatization does indeed increase efciency in our deterministic economy setting.
4.2 Heterogeneous-Agent Economy with Wage Shocks
Run 2 in Table 8 shows the effects of the same stylized privatization experiment in a
more realistic economy with uninsurable wage shocks. Unlike in the deterministic economy,
Social Security's progressive benet formula now shares some wage risks, thereby providing
some insurance that is unattainable in the private market. National wealth now increases
by 18.7 percent in the long run, but by less than in the representative-agent economy (Run
1) because a portion of private saving in the pre-reform economy is now for precautionary
motives, which is less sensitive to changes in Social Security policy. Labor supply increases
by 3.5 percent in the long run and GNP is 7.8 percent higher.
Similar to the representative-agent economy, most households alive at the time of the
reform are worse off because they have to pay higher taxes to nance the transition. Run
2 in Table 9 shows that relatively high wage (and, hence, wealthier) households tend to be
hit the hardest by the consumption tax. For example, a 40-year old in the top one percent
of the wage distribution (e8) at the time of privatization loses $368,400. As with Run 1,
future households, however, gain considerably from the lower payroll and income tax rates
as well as higher wages. Even households in the lowest 20 percent of the wage distribution
(e1) born 20 years after the reform gain $52,400 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars). Overall,
privatization, though, no longer improves efciency. After the LSRA returns the welfare
25To save on space, we don't report the change in macroeconomic variables for the experiments with the
LSRA. These tables, however, are available upon request.
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of all households to their pre-reform levels, it distributes a negative $5,600 to each future
household. This loss contrasts sharply with the gain of $21,900 in the deterministic economy
discussed above.
4.3 Alternative Experiments in the Heterogeneous-Agent Economy
In a Small Open Economy. Run 3, reported in Table 10, shows the effect of privatization
in the setting of a small open economy where any changes in the capital-labor ratio are nul-
lied immediately by international capital ows. Since interest rates do not decline, national
wealth increases by substantially more in the long run relative to the closed economy setting
 by almost double  reported earlier in Run 2 (Table 8). The gain in labor supply, though,
is smaller since the wage rate does not rise. GNP increases gradually and by 11.5 percent in
the long run, compared to only 7.8 percent in Run 2.
Table 11 shows that the welfare losses of households alive at the time of the reform
tend to be smaller relative to the closed economy (Run 2, Table 9), mostly due to the xed
interest rate. Furthermore, the gains to future households tend to be a little larger in the
small open economy, especially for wealthier households who see the reduction in the rate of
return to capital in the closed economy but not in the small open economy. On the whole, it
might, therefore, appear at rst that privatization in an open economy setting would produce
a smaller efciency loss than in the closed economy. Interestingly, this hunch is incorrect.
When the LSRA is operative, Table 11 shows that the efciency losses are actually slightly
larger in the small open economy, equal to $6,600 per each future household. The reason
is that the LSRA's cost of borrowing is higher in the small open economy setting since the
interest rate does not decrease over time after privatization, as in the closed-economy setting.
Perfect Annuity Markets. Thus far, we have assumed private annuity markets do not exist
and so, in addition to sharing wage uncertainty, the Social Security system shares longevity
uncertainty in a way the private market cannot. It would appear at rst glance, therefore, that
privatization has a better chance of producing efciency gains if we instead assumed that a
private annuity market is available. Surprisingly, this intuition also turns out to be incorrect.
Run 4 in Table 11 shows that the efciency losses are actually larger with perfect private
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Table 10: Alternative Experiments in the Heterogenous Agent Economy with Wage Shocks
 Percent Change in Selected Macro Variables Relative to Baseline
GNP National Labor Interest Wage Income Consump-
Run # Year t Wealth Supply Rate Rate Tax tion Tax
Rate2 Rate
3 1 2.1 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 -7.3 5.4
Small Open 10 3.6 7.3 2.0 0.0 0.0 -7.5 4.9
Economy1 20 5.6 14.5 1.8 0.0 0.0 -8.6 3.7
40 9.3 27.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 -10.4 1.0
Long Run 11.5 36.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 -10.8 -0.1
4 1 1.2 0.0 1.8 2.1 -0.5 -5.8 5.5
Perfect Annuity 10 2.3 4.2 1.5 -3.1 0.8 -6.4 4.8
Markets1 20 3.5 7.4 1.9 -6.0 1.6 -7.6 3.7
40 5.7 12.4 2.9 -10.0 2.7 -9.5 0.9
Long Run 6.4 14.4 3.2 -11.7 3.1 -10.1 -0.2
5 1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.5 5.6
Contribution 10 0.7 2.2 0.1 -2.5 0.6 -0.4 5.0
Matching 20 2.0 5.1 0.8 -5.1 1.3 -2.0 3.8
Starting at 10%1 40 4.7 11.5 2.0 -10.6 2.7 -4.6 1.0
Long Run 5.9 15.1 2.1 -14.0 3.6 -5.6 -0.2
6 1 -1.9 0.0 -2.7 -3.4 0.8 9.0 5.8
Contribution 10 -1.5 -0.5 -2.0 -1.8 0.4 8.0 5.3
Matching 20 -0.5 1.2 -1.2 -3.0 0.8 6.5 4.0
Starting at 20%1 40 2.2 7.2 0.1 -8.2 2.1 3.3 1.0
Long Run 3.4 11.0 0.3 -12.0 3.1 2.1 -0.1
7 1 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.9 -0.2 -4.2 7.1
More Progressive 10 1.3 2.2 0.8 -1.7 0.4 -5.1 6.4
S.S. Bend Points 20 2.6 5.3 1.5 -4.5 1.1 -6.6 5.0
120 / 32 / 10%1 40 5.5 12.2 2.7 -10.5 2.7 -9.2 1.8
Long Run 6.7 16.1 2.9 -14.2 3.7 -10.1 0.4
8 1 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -3.0 8.9
More Progressive 10 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -3.6 8.3
S.S. Bend Points 20 1.3 2.6 0.7 -2.2 0.6 -5.1 6.6
150 / 32 / 10%1 40 4.3 9.4 2.1 -8.2 2.1 -8.0 2.8
Long Run 5.5 13.4 2.3 -12.1 3.1 -8.9 1.2
*1. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2, i.e., the changes are not cumulative.
*2. The proportional change in marginal tax rates across all households.
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Table 11: Change in Welfare per Household (1,000 dollars in 2001)
Without LSRA1 With LSRA2
Age in Select Productivities For all
Run # Year 1 e1 e3 e5 e8 Productivities
3 79 -4.8 -5.6 -14.4 -75.7 0.0
Small Open 60 -25.8 -40.1 -54.6 -184.8 0.0
Economy3 40 -15.3 -37.3 -57.1 -155.5 0.0
20 1.1 1.6 3.5 15.9 0.0
0 23.6 29.9 39.2 73.0 -6.6
-20 39.8 50.1 64.2 112.5 -6.6
4 79 -4.3 -5.1 -12.7 -63.1 0.0
Perfect Annuity 60 -21.5 -33.4 -47.9 -296.9 0.0
Markets3 40 -13.1 -32.4 -51.5 -288.5 0.0
20 4.9 3.3 2.5 1.1 0.0
0 24.6 26.6 30.2 43.5 -7.2
-20 36.2 40.7 47.7 72.3 -7.2
5 79 -5.3 -6.3 -16.5 -91.2 0.0
Contribution 60 -28.3 -40.8 -68.3 -558.4 0.0
Matching 40 -9.3 -48.8 -86.8 -471.4 0.0
Starting at 10%3 20 11.6 7.1 -4.3 -32.1 0.0
0 40.4 40.4 34.9 24.1 -4.4
-20 60.5 63.7 62.7 65.7 -4.4
6 79 -6.0 -7.1 -19.0 -107.6 0.0
Contribution 60 -29.4 -38.5 -74.0 -825.8 0.0
Matching 40 -0.2 -53.1 -103.8 -614.9 0.0
Starting at 20%3 20 19.3 13.4 -6.5 -56.8 0.0
0 45.9 44.6 30.3 -4.3 -9.9
-20 66.6 68.5 58.7 38.8 -9.9
7 79 34.2 32.9 20.7 -69.3 0.0
More Progressive 60 7.1 6.1 -25.2 -469.9 0.0
S.S. Bend Points 40 -13.2 -41.1 -76.4 -407.2 0.0
120 / 32 / 10%3 20 -4.9 -9.8 -15.3 -32.6 0.0
0 25.8 26.0 26.9 28.3 -0.1
-20 47.9 51.6 57.6 74.2 -0.1
8 79 76.5 75.2 61.9 -45.6 0.0
More Progressive 60 47.8 59.0 25.7 -548.5 0.0
S.S. Bend Points 40 -9.8 -37.7 -75.5 -442.6 0.0
150 / 32 / 10%3 20 -13.4 -19.4 -26.9 -50.5 0.0
0 17.6 16.8 16.3 12.0 2.7
-20 41.7 45.1 50.1 63.0 2.7
*1. Standard equivalent variations measures.
*2. Value oftr:
*3. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2, i.e., the changes are not cumulative.
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annuity markets than without (Run 2). In particular, each household loses $7,200, compared
to $5,600 shown earlier (Run 2, Table 9) without an annuity market. Privatization with
perfect private annuities leads to only a 14.4 percent increase in national wealth in the long
run (Table 10), compared to a 18.7 percent increase without a private annuity market (Run 2,
Table 8). The reason is that households increase their precautionary savings in Run 2 after
privatization as the annuity insurance provided by Social Security is reduced; in contrast,
households can rely more on the private annuity insurance market rather than precautionary
savings in Run 4. The smaller amount of precautionary savings in Run 4 produces larger
efciency losses for three reasons: (i) the LSRA must borrow at a relatively higher interest
rate; (ii) income taxes are higher since there is less capital and labor income; and (iii) the
interest elasticity of saving is higher, increasing the role that falling interest rates have on
discouraging additional saving.
Contribution Matching. The pre-reform Social Security system is progressive by giving
households with a lower average index of pre-retirement wages a larger Social Security bene-
t relative to their pre-retirement wages, that is, a larger replacement rate. This progressiv-
ity provides some insurance against wage uncertainty. To be sure, the privatized experiment
considered above preserves some progressivity by reducing benets proportionally only by
half in the long runthe poor still get a larger replacement rate. But a proportional reduc-
tion in benets still reduces progressivity; for example, reducing all benets by 100 percent
would eliminate progressivity.
Run 5, therefore, considers privatization with a progressive contribution match. In par-
ticular, working households with low levels of labor income receive a fairly generous match
equal to 10 percent of their earnings. This matching rate declines linearly to zero as labor
income approaches $60,000, which is slightly above the median household income in the
model economy.26 While ensuing Social Security decits continue to be nanced with a
consumption tax, the contribution match is nanced each year by increasing the marginal
income tax rates proportionally across all households; the key qualitative results would be
unchanged if the consumption tax were used instead. As before, income tax rates are changed
26This matching schedule is equivalent with the marginal labor income tax of -10 percent at $0 of labor income,
0 percent at $30,000, 10 percent at $60,000, and 0 percent for labor income above $60,000.
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so that the rest of government budget is balanced throughout the transition path.
As shown in Run 5 in Table 10, privatization with contribution matching increases na-
tional wealth, GNP and labor supply throughout the transition path compared to the pre-
reform baseline economy. However, the long-run increases in national wealth, labor supply,
and GNP are smaller relative to the case without contribution matching (Run 2 in Table 8)
since the match must be nanced with a distorting income tax. In the long run, GNP increases
by only 5.9 percent, compared to 7.8 percent without the match.
The welfare gains for Run 5 reported in Table 11 show that contribution matching tends
to improve the welfare of poorer households relative to Run 2 without the match. Whereas
the poorest household born in the future gains $52,400 without the match, they gain $60,500
with the match. Not surprising, the richest households, however, are worse off since they
don't receive any of the match but must help nance it; they gained $84,300 without the
match in the long run but only $65,700 with the match. With the LSRA, privatization still
leads to efciency losses, equal to about $4,400 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) per future
household. But this loss is smaller than the $5,600 loss without the match.
Run 6 doubles the starting match rate from 10 percent at zero wage income to 20 percent.
As before, this match declines linearly to zero as labor income approaches $60,000. Table
11 shows that, with the LSRA, this more generous match produces efciency losses equal to
$9,900 per future household, which is larger in magnitude relative to the 10 percent match
and even Run 2 without any match. This non-monotonic behavior in efciency losses is due
to the trade-off between risk sharing and labor supply distortions: some match is benecial
but is dominated by distortions at higher tax rates.27 In fact, there is no match rate that
allows privatization to produced efciency gains. Moreover, several alternative designs of
contribution matching performed even worse.28
27These distortions arise from both the income tax used to nance the match as well as the effective marginal
tax rates caused by the match itself.
28For example, a proportional match for all households performed worse because, while eliminating implicit
marginal tax rates in the phase-out range, it enhanced the income tax distortions since more revenue is needed.
We also considered nancing the phased-out match with a negative match on those with above-average incomes.
Although potentially more efcient at redistribution than an income tax, as the poor are not nancing their own
match, it also performed worse. Labor supply tends to be fairly elastic in our model whereas the savings elasticity
is relatively low with precautionary saving.
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Progressive Benet Schedule. Run 7 takes a different approach to maintaining some pro-
gressivity after privatization. It immediately increases the progressivity of the Social Security
benet that remains after privatization by raising the replacement rate of the lowest wage in-
come bracket from 90 percent to 120 percent while reducing the replacement rate of the
highest wage income bracket from 15 percent to 10 percent. Run 8 is even more aggres-
sive in redistribution by raising the replacement rate of the lowest wage income bracket to
150 percent. Table 11 shows that this approach is very effective at protecting the welfare
of the poor at the time of reform as well as reducing efciency losses. Now, privatization
reduces efciency by only $100 per future household under the LSRA in Run 8. But privati-
zation actually increases efciency by $2,700 per future household in Run 8. Increasing the
progressivity of the smaller Social Security system that remains after privatization is more
efcient than contribution matching because a considerable amount of redistribution can be
accomplished with less distortion to labor supply, that is, with smaller effective tax rates at
the margin. In particular, whereas contribution matching is based on the labor income in any
given year, Social Security's progressive benet is based on a household's lifetime earnings,
which is harder to change.
4.4 Alternative Assumptions of Transitory Shocks and Persistence
A key assumption in our model is the size of the transitory working ability shocks and
their persistence. Recall that we constructed the age-working ability schedule from the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the transition matrices from the 1989-92 Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). To deal with possible measurement errors, our bench-
mark Markov transition matrixes are calculated after taking three-year moving averages of
workers' hourly wages. This ad hoc treatment reduces the size of transitory wage shocks in
the original data by about one-third. Floden and Lindé (2001), however, persuasively argue
that measurement error in the PSID might be as large as the size of the real uctuation. Thus,
although we have already smoothed away some of that error by focusing on three-year
moving averages, the transitory shocks in our model might still be too large.
Run 9 shown in Tables 12 and 13 show the economic and welfare effects, respectively, of
privatization when the transitory shocks are reduced to only half of their previous values we
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Table 12: Alternative Transitory Shocks - Percent Change in Selected Macro Variables Rel-
ative to Baseline
GNP National Labor Interest Wage Income Consump-
Run # Year t Wealth Supply Rate Rate Tax tion Tax
Rate2 Rate
9 1 1.5 0.0 2.2 2.7 -0.7 -6.3 5.6
1
2 Transitory 10 3.0 5.0 2.1 -3.4 0.8 -7.5 4.9
Shocks1 20 4.6 9.4 2.6 -7.7 1.9 -9.2 3.7
40 7.5 16.6 3.8 -13.7 3.6 -11.7 0.9
Long Run 8.7 20.4 4.0 -17.1 4.5 -12.6 -0.3
10 1 1.6 0.0 2.3 2.8 -0.7 -6.4 5.7
1
5 Transitory 10 3.1 5.4 2.2 -3.8 0.9 -7.8 5.0
Shocks1 20 4.9 10.1 2.7 -8.3 2.1 -9.6 3.7
40 7.9 17.4 4.0 -14.3 3.7 -12.4 0.9
Long Run 9.1 21.4 4.2 -17.8 4.7 -13.4 -0.3
*1. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2, i.e., the changes are not cumulative.
*2. The proportional change in marginal tax rates across all households.
used in the main calibration. Run 10 goes even further: it reduces the shocks to only one-fth
of the values under the main calibration. National wealth increases by 20.4 percent in the
long run in Run 9, compared to 18.7 percent for Run 2. However, notice that the efciency
losses actually increase to $8,200 per future household (relative to a $5,600 loss in Run 2)
under the LSRA. This counter-intuitive result can be explained by the fact that a reduction in
transitory shocks also increases the persistence of any shock. As a result, the effect of any
negative shock becomes more permanent, potentially increasing the value of the risk sharing
in the former Social Security system.29
In the limit, however, the model collapses to one with no wage uncertainty if the transi-
tory shocks are eliminated. In Run 10, the transitory shocks are reduced to one-fth of their
benchmark levels and in this case, privatization produces a smaller efciency loss, compared
to Run 9, equal to about $5,800 per future household. These two policy experiments show
that changes in the amount of wage uncertainty have a non-monotonic impact on efciency
gains.
29We beneted from a helpful conversation with Dirk Krueger on this point.
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Table 13: Change in Welfare per Household (3) (1,000 dollars in 2001)
Without LSRA2 With LSRA3
Age in Select Productivities For all
Run # Year 1 e1 e3 e5 e8 Productivities
9 79 -4.2 -5.1 -13.8 -116.5 0.0
1
2 Transitory 60 -25.6 -44.4 -65.4 -388.0 0.0
Shocks1 40 -28.0 -58.6 -81.4 -419.1 0.0
20 -7.2 -12.9 -15.4 -13.1 0.0
0 18.7 21.6 31.6 73.0 -8.2
-20 35.2 43.6 61.1 127.4 -8.2
10 79 -4.8 -6.1 -13.1 -171.5 0.0
1
5 Transitory 60 -26.3 -48.4 -68.6 -411.4 0.0
Shocks1 40 -40.5 -73.7 -84.3 -408.6 0.0
20 -19.5 -26.9 -22.6 16.9 0.0
0 0.6 8.6 35.8 161.5 -5.8
-20 13.6 30.3 69.7 241.0 -5.8
*1. Each Run represents one change in assumption relative to Run 2.
*2. Standard equivalent variations measures.
*3. Value oftr:
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated whether a stylized Social Security privatization generates ef-
ciency gains or losses in the presence of an overlapping-generations economy with elastic
labor supply and idiosyncratic wage shocks and longevity uncertainty. We found that the
privatization of Social Security produces efciency gains in a representative-agent economy
without wage shocks (or, equivalently, if these shocks are insurable). In a heterogeneous-
agent economy with idiosyncratic and uninsurable wage shocks, however, the overall ef-
ciency of the economy is reduced by our stylized privatization since the existing Social
Security system provides a valuable source of risk sharing through its progressive benet
formula. This result was fairly robust to a wide range of model considerations: (i) the degree
of openness of the economy; (ii) allowing the availability of actuarially-fair private annu-
ities; (iii) the introduction of various risk-sharing mechanisms after privatization; and (iv)
sharply reducing the size of transitory wage shocks. Only in the case in which the benet
replacement rate of the lowest bracket was increased to 150 percent from 90 percent did we
nd efciency gains. Rather interestingly, privatization performs relatively better in a closed
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economy where the rate of return falls as capital is accumulated; surprisingly, privatization
even performs relatively better when private annuity markets do not exist. Furthermore,
matching the contribution of poorer workers can actually do more harm than good, whereas
increasing the progressivity of the Social Security system that remains works well.
One of the possible limitations of our model is that it does not distinguish by various
demographic groups, including race and gender. There is some evidence, for example, that
black Americans do not live as long as non-blacks, even after controlling for differences in
earnings. Blacks are also less likely to be married at the point of retirement and, therefore,
less likely to qualify for a spousal benet.30 In contrast, women have a higher life expectancy
than males, and they might also face a higher effective marginal tax rate on their contribu-
tions if they are the household's secondary earner. Incorporating these additional sources of
heterogeneity would possibly change the welfare implications of this paper.
30See, for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2001).
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Appendices
A Transition Matrixes and Survival Rates
Markov Transition Matrixes. The Markov transition matrixes of working ability are con-
structed for four age groups20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59from the hourly wages in the
PSID individual data 1990, 91, 92, and 93. To reduce the size of transitory shocks, possibly
caused by measurement errors, the transition matrix of each age group is calculated with
transition probabilities from the average wages between 1989 and 91 to the average wages
between of 1990 and 92. For households aged 60 or older, we used the matrix for ages 50-59.
 i2f20;:::;29g =
0BBBBBBBBB@
0.7601 0.2101 0.0289 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1919 0.6171 0.1635 0.0221 0.0054 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0406 0.1546 0.5976 0.1794 0.0153 0.0068 0.0028 0.0029
0.0063 0.0181 0.1787 0.6723 0.1128 0.0118 0.0000 0.0000
0.0018 0.0000 0.0506 0.2524 0.5792 0.0995 0.0165 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0244 0.0000 0.2744 0.5719 0.1293 0.0000
0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0372 0.1937 0.6646 0.1035





0.8537 0.1332 0.0082 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1283 0.6837 0.1744 0.0129 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0175 0.1723 0.6788 0.1269 0.0000 0.0045 0.0000 0.0000
0.0005 0.0109 0.1314 0.7374 0.1014 0.0144 0.0040 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0144 0.2008 0.7016 0.0728 0.0104 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0460 0.1874 0.6182 0.1484 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0298 0.0011 0.2008 0.7147 0.0536





0.8561 0.1371 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1301 0.7275 0.1222 0.0145 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.1111 0.7145 0.1588 0.0000 0.0156 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0179 0.1484 0.6992 0.1221 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0162 0.2548 0.6594 0.0696 0.0000 0.0000
0.0252 0.0257 0.0000 0.0000 0.1702 0.6744 0.1045 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0933 0.8366 0.0701





0.8249 0.1629 0.0000 0.0122 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1552 0.6754 0.1694 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0200 0.0997 0.7643 0.1052 0.0108 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0620 0.0663 0.8079 0.0559 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1492 0.7194 0.1314 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2942 0.6239 0.0819 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1024 0.8573 0.0403
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1613 0.8387
1CCCCCCCCCA
;




Survival Rates of Households. The survival rates i at the end of age i = f20; :::; 109g
are the weighted averages of males and females and calculated from the period life table
(Table 4.C6) in Social Security Administration (2001). The survival rates at the end of age
109 are replaced by zero.
Table 14: Survival Rates in 1998 in the United States (Weighted Average of Males and
Females)
Age Survival Age Survival Age Survival Age Survival Age Survival
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
20 0.999104 40 0.997966 60 0.989315 80 0.937788 100 0.676630
21 0.999057 41 0.997807 61 0.988305 81 0.931527 101 0.658554
22 0.999027 42 0.997640 62 0.987134 82 0.924684 102 0.639355
23 0.999018 43 0.997451 63 0.985773 83 0.917252 103 0.618962
24 0.999023 44 0.997252 64 0.984249 84 0.909150 104 0.597297
25 0.999034 45 0.997027 65 0.982548 85 0.900275 105 0.574281
26 0.999040 46 0.996778 66 0.980759 86 0.890541 106 0.549828
27 0.999033 47 0.996514 67 0.979000 87 0.879882 107 0.523850
28 0.999006 48 0.996237 68 0.977325 88 0.868264 108 0.496251
29 0.998962 49 0.995938 69 0.975647 89 0.855676 109 0.000000
30 0.998911 50 0.995603 70 0.973769 90 0.842119
31 0.998857 51 0.995222 71 0.971613 91 0.827606
32 0.998796 52 0.994797 72 0.969264 92 0.812154
33 0.998727 53 0.994324 73 0.966703 93 0.795784
34 0.998651 54 0.993795 74 0.963868 94 0.778522
35 0.998564 55 0.993198 75 0.960661 95 0.761075
36 0.998466 56 0.992534 76 0.957027 96 0.743640
37 0.998358 57 0.991818 77 0.952967 97 0.726432
38 0.998240 58 0.991051 78 0.948449 98 0.709688
39 0.998111 59 0.990216 79 0.943423 99 0.693653
Source: Authors' calculations from the Table 4.C6, Social Security Administration (2001).
B The Computation of Equilibria
The algorithm to solve the model for a steady-state equilibrium and an equilibrium transi-
tion path is similar to those in Conesa and Krueger (1999), Nishiyama (2002), and Nishiyama
and Smetters (2004).
B.1 The Discretization of the State Space
The state of a household is si = (i; ei; ai; bi) 2 IEAB; where I = f20; :::; 109g,
E = [emin; emax], A = [amin; amax], and B = [bmin; bmax]. To compute an equilibrium, the
state space of a household is discretized as ŝi 2 IÊiÂB̂;where Êi = fe1i ; e2i ; :::; e
Ne
i g,
Â = fa1; a2; :::; aNag, and B̂ = fb1; b2; :::; bNbg. For all these discrete points, the model
computes the optimal decision of households, d(̂si;St;	t) = (ci (:) ; hi (:) ; ai+1 (:)) 2
34
(0; cmax] [0; hmaxi ]A; the marginal values, @@av(̂si;St;	t) and
@
@bv(̂si;St;	t), and the
values v(̂si;St;	t), given the expected factor prices and policy variables.31
To nd the optimal end-of-period wealth, the model uses the Euler equation and bilinear
interpolation (with respect to a and b) of marginal values at the beginning of the next period.32
In a heterogeneous-agent economy, Ne, Na, and Nb are 8, 57, and 8, respectively. In a
representative-agent economy, the numbers of grid points are 1, 61, and 6, respectively.33
B.2 A Steady-State Equilibrium
The algorithm to compute a steady-state equilibrium is as follows. Let	 denote the time-
invariant government policy rule	 = (WLS ;WG; CG; I(:); P (:); C ; trSS (̂si); trLS (̂si)):
1. Set the initial values of factor prices (r0; w0), accidental bequests q0, the policy vari-










of policy functions (I(:); trSS (̂si))
if these are determined endogenously.34
2. Given








SS), nd the decision rule of a household
d(̂si;	;

0) for all ŝi 2 I  Êi  Â B̂.35
(a) For age i = 109, nd the decision rule d(̂s109;	;
0). Since the survival rate
109 = 0, the end-of-period wealth ai+1(̂s109; :) = 0 for all ŝ109. Compute con-




0) and values v(̂s109;	;
0) for all ŝ109.36





0), and values v(̂si;	;







i. Set the initial guess of a0i+1(̂si; :).





these into the Euler equation with @@av(̂si+1;	;

0).
31Because the marginal value with respect to historical earnings, @
@b
v(̂si;St;	t), is difcult to obtain analyt-
ically, it is approximated by (v(:; bj+1;St;	t)  v(:; bj ;St;	t))=(bj+1   bj) where j = 1; 2; :::; Nb:
32The marginal values with respect to wealth, @
@a
v(̂si;St;	t), are used in the Euler equation to obtain optimal
savings, the marginal values with respect to historical earnings, @
@b
v(̂si;St;	t), are used in the marginal rate of
substitution condition of consumption for leisure to obtain optimal working hours, and the values, v(̂si;St;	t),
are used to calculate welfare changes measured by compensating and equivalent variations in wealth.
33The grid points on A and B are not equally spaced. In a heterogeneous-agent economy, Â ranges from
-$271,000 to $33,825,000 (in 2001 growth-adjusted dollars) and B̂ ranges from $8,000 to $80,400. In a
representative-agent economy, Â and B̂ range from -$333,000 to $1,573,000 and from $8,000 to $80,400, re-
spectively.
34If we nd the capital-labor ratio, both r and w are calculated from the given production function and depre-
ciation rate. In this paper, the endogenous policy variables are CG and 'SS in baseline economies, and C , 'I ,
trLS (̂si), andWLS in policy experiments.
35In the steady-state economy, the decision rule of a household d(̂si;	;
0) is not a function of the aggregate
state of economy Ŝ = (x(̂si);WLS ;WG): The measure of household x(̂si) is determined uniquely by the
steady-state condition, and the government's wealthWG is determined by the policy rule	.




0); is zero when i > 60 in this paper.
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iii. If the Euler error is sufciently small, then stop. Otherwise, update a0i+1(̂si; :)
and return to Step ii.
3. Find the steady-state measure of households x(̂si;
0) using the decision rule obtained
in Step 2. This computation is done forward from age 20 to age 109. Repeat this step
to iterate q for q1:
4. Compute new factor prices (r1; w1), accidental bequests q1, the policy variables (W 1LS ;
C1G; 
1


















0. If the difference is suf-
ciently small, then stop. Otherwise, update 
0 and return to Step 2.
B.3 An Equilibrium Transition Path
Assume that the economy is in the initial steady state in period 0, and that the new policy
schedule 	1, which was not expected in period 0, is announced at the beginning of period 1,
where 	1 = fWLS;t+1;WG;t+1; CG;t; I;t (:) ; P;t (:) ; C;t; trSS;t (̂si) ; trLS;t(̂si)g1t=1: Let
Ŝ1 = (x1(̂si);WLS;1;WG;1) be the state of the economy at the beginning of period 1. The
state of the economy Ŝ1 is usually equal to that of the initial steady state. The algorithm
to compute a transition path to a new steady-state equilibrium (thereafter, nal steady-state
equilibrium) is as follows.
1. Choose a sufciently large number, T , such that the economy is said to reach the new
steady state within T periods. Set the initial guess, 
01 = fr0s ; w0s ; q0s ;W 0LS;s; 0C;s;
'0I;sgTs=1, on factor prices, accidental bequests, and the policy variables. Because there
are no aggregate productivity shocks in this model, a time series 





I;sgTs=t is deterministic, and each household perfectly foresees
t based
on the information Ŝt in an equilibrium. Since Ŝt is in a household decision rule
only to make the household expect
t rationally, in the computation, we can avoid the
curse of dimensionality by replacing d(̂si; Ŝt;	t) with d(̂si;	t;
t).
2. GivenWLS;T ; nd the nal steady-state decision rule d(̂si;	T ;





T ), and values v(̂si;	T ; 
0T ) for all ŝi 2 I  Êi  Â  B̂. (See the
algorithm for a steady-state equilibrium.)
3. For period t = T   1; T   2; :::; 1; based on the guess,
0t ; nd backward the decision
rule d(̂si;	t;
0t ), marginal values @@av(̂si;	t;

0
t ), and values v(̂si;	t;
0t ) for all






4. For period t = 1; 2; :::; T   1, compute forward (r0t ; w0t ; q0t ;W 0LS;t; 0C;t; '0I;t) and the
measure of households xt+1(̂si), using the decision rule d(̂si;	t;
0t ) obtained in
Step 3 and using the state of economy Ŝt = (xt(̂si);WLS;t;WG;t) recursively.
5. Compare 
1t with 
0t . If the difference is sufciently small, then stop. Otherwise,
update 
0t and return to Step 2.
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B.4 The Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority
When the Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA) is assumed, the following com-
putation is added to the iteration process.
1. For period t = T; T   1; :::; 2, compute the lump-sum transfers to newborn house-
holds trCV (̂s20;	t;
0t ) to make those households as well off as under the pre-reform
economy.
(a) Set the initial value of lump-sum transfers trCV (̂s20;	t;
0t ) to newborn house-
holds.
(b) Given trCV (̂s20;	t;




t ) and values v(̂s20;	t;
0t ):
(c) Find the compensating variation in wealth trCV (̂s20;	t;
0t ) to make those
households indifferent from the baseline economy. (The initial wealth of new-
born households is assumed to be zero since they do not receive any bequests.)
If the absolute value oftrCV (̂s20;	t;
0t ) is sufciently small, then go to Step
(d). Otherwise, update trCV (̂s20;	t;
0t ) by adding trCV (̂s20;	t;
0t ) and
return to Step (b).
(d) Set the lump-sum transfers trLS;t(̂s20) = trCV (̂s20;	t;
0t ) + tr where an
additional lump-sum transfer tr is precalculated, and nd the decision rule of
newborn households d(̂s20;	t;
0t ):
2. For period t = 1, compute the lump-sum transfers to all current households trCV (̂si;	t;

0t ) to make those households as much better off as the pre-reform economy. The pro-
cedure is similar to Step 1. Set the lump-sum transfers trLS;1(̂si) = trCV (̂si;	t;
0t ):
3. Compute an additional lump-sum transfer tr to newborn households so that the net
present value of all transfers becomes zero. Compute the LSRA wealth, fW 1LS;tgTt=1,
which will be used to calculate national wealth. Recompute tr and fW 1LS;tgTt=1
using new interest rates frtgTt=1.
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